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7.1 Introduction
The stock markets of China have been developed quickly and in a very
diﬀerent way from other country’s stock markets. Since establishment of
the markets, China has adopted a dual-track equity system (or so-called
parallel market) with nontradable and tradable shares. The nontradable
shares are owned by the government agencies of various levels, who are fre-
quently the controlling shareholders of many listed companies. A major
feature of the dual-track equity system might be the privatization of these
state-owned companies over the least ten years in the stock market. By
2002, it was estimated that 11 percent of listed companies were privately
owned. And to the end of 2005, private individuals controlled about 26 per-
cent of listed companies. The changes are brought forth by thousands of
transactions, including management buy outs and negotiated transfers of
control rights.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the nature of merger and ac-
quisition (M&A) activity and analyze how it aﬀects a company’s value in
China’s stock markets. The study of China’s M&A markets can help us to
understand better how the stock markets function with the special institu-
tional arrangement of the dual-track equity system. We focus on the most
recent period from 2004 to 2005 because M&A activities have been grow-
ing rapidly in this period. The total value of M&A activities reached 211 bil-
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M&A value in 2002. In addition, China’s stock markets also experienced 
institutional changes in recent years, with the reform of the dual-track eq-
uity system ﬁrst implemented in mid-2005. As China’s stock market went
through fundamental changes and the M&A activities also became very
lively in this period, it will be interesting to assess whether M&As can bring
value for listed companies for the period from 2004 to 2005.
In the ﬁrst part of the chapter, we adopt the event-study method (see
Brown and Warner 1985; Bruner 2002) to assess the eﬀects of M&As in
China. We use estimates of abnormal returns, the diﬀerence between actual
and expected stock returns, to measure the economic eﬀects of M&As. The
expected returns are based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM),
with the market index serving as the benchmark to summarize the inﬂuence
of marketwide events on the returns of individual stocks. After reviewing
thirteen studies of U.S. market data, Jensen and Ruback (1983) found that
targets of successful mergers earn signiﬁcantly positive returns around 20
to 30 percent, but returns to bidding ﬁrm shareholders are zero. Their con-
clusions are also conﬁrmed by more recent works, as summarized by
Bruner (2002).
It will be interesting to study whether such a pattern of returns also
emerges in China’s M&A market. Loaded with heavy computation of the
CAPM models for these individual stocks, this chapter only concentrates
on the M&A activities from 2004 to 2005. In 2004, we collect data of 611
M&A events involving 499 companies, and in 2005, we ﬁnd 752 M&A
events involving 587 companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges. We then examine the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of
M&A events in depressed markets and upbeat markets.
Because privatization is an important feature in China’s stock market,
we will study how the ownership structure may aﬀect the CAR of M&A
events. After separating M&A activities into those initiated by state hold-
ing companies and those initiated by privately owned companies, we can
ﬁnd that M&A activities were value-creating for both private- and state-
controlled ﬁrms in 2005, but only for private-controlled ﬁrms in 2004. We
also try to explain why this might be so. In addition, we also examine the
CAR of acquiring and target ﬁrms. We can ﬁnd that the positive returns of
M&A in 2005 were evenly shared by acquiring and target ﬁrms.
The validity of the event-study method relies much on the stock market
being eﬃcient such that the CAPM can be used to capture the market in-
ﬂuence on individual stocks. However, there exist doubts about the eﬃ-
ciency of China’s stock markets as they are in a ﬂux of institutional trans-
formation. And our event studies also lead to mixed results. The alternative
avenue of investigation is to use the accounting method. Using the return
on assets (ROA), Meeks (1977) found that merger activities brought ROA
down for bidding ﬁrms. Mueller (1980) found that proﬁtability of acquir-
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Other related works include Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) and Clark
and Ofek (1994), who adopt various accounting indicators to study M&A
events.
In the second part of the chapter, we use accounting indicators as a com-
plementary way to understand the eﬀects of M&As in China. We obtain ﬁ-
nancial indicators for four years and study whether the ﬁnancial condi-
tions of M&A companies demonstrated a deteriorating or improving trend
after the M&A event. We examine how earning per share (EPS), return on
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), operating cash ﬂows (OCF), free
cash ﬂows (FCF), and other indicators change during and after M&A. We
also obtain from ﬁnancial statements the current ratio, quick ratio, equity
multiplier, and liability to equity ratio to study their ability to repay debt
before and after merger.
In the next section, we describe M&A activities in China’s stock markets.
The economic eﬀects of M&A as analyzed by the event-study method are
discussed in section 7.3. The results from using accounting methods are 
examined in section 7.4. Section 7.5 provides concluding remarks about
our ﬁndings.
7.2 Merger Activities in China’s Stock Market
As of June 2007, China’s stock market has a capitalization of US$2,400
billion, with an upward trend in transaction volume and relative impor-
tance in the global ﬁnancial market. About 900 of the 1,300-plus list com-
panies have their controlling parties from government agencies of various
levels. Many of the merger activities involve decisions by government agen-
cies, which is a special feature of China’s M&A market. The dollar amounts
of merger activities occurring in the stock market have been growing in re-
cent years, with a signiﬁcant increase in total values of M&A activities after
2004 (table 7.1). The total values of M&A in 2004 and 2005 are about 1 per-
cent of China’s gross national product (table 7.2).
We collect all M&A announcements with values exceeding 10 million
RMB and obtain 1,363 events involving 1,086 companies in 2004 and 2005.
In 2005, there are 587 ﬁrms involved in 752 merger activities (table 7.3).
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Table 7.1 The size of merger activities, 2002–2005




2005 1,219 132.32In 2004, there are 499 ﬁrms involved in 611 events of M&A (table 7.4).
As for the ownership structure, there were 503 events in 2005 with state
holding companies as the controlling shareholders and 211 events with pri-
vately owned enterprises as the controlling shareholder (table 7.5).
In year 2004, there were 426 events with state holding companies as the
controlling shareholders and 142 events with privately owned enterprises
as the controlling shareholders (table 7.6).
The reform of the dual-trade equity system was ﬁrst implemented in
May 2005. The stock market also went through a cyclical phase for the pe-
riod from 2004 to 2005, with Shanghai composite stock index dropping to
below the 1,000-point level on June 6, 2005, returning to the level of eight
years prior. The market index has been rising ever since then (ﬁgure 7.1and
ﬁgure 7.2).
During the ﬁrst half of 2005, before June 3, 300 events of M&A occurred
together with a downward market. For the second half of 2005, there were
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Table 7.2 Relative importance of merger activities (billion RMB)
2004 2005 Growth rate (%)
Total amount 211.69 132.32 –37.5
GDP 13,651.5 18,232.1 9.9
Total amount/GDP (%) 1.55 0.73 –52.9
Table 7.3 Sample of merger activities in 2005
Shanghai stock exchange Shenzhen stock exchange Total
Firms 361 226 587
Events 468 284 752
Table 7.4 Sample of merger activities in 2004
Shanghai stock exchange Shenzhen stock exchange Total
Firms 312 187 499
Events 397 214 611
Table 7.5 Types of controlling shareholders in 2005
State holding  Privately owned  Foreign-owned 
Type company enterprise company Others Total
Shanghai 312 127 4 25 468
Shenzhen 191 84 0 9 284
Total 503 211 4 34 752452 events of M&A in the market with an upward trend (table 7.7). This pe-
riod also coincided with the early phase of reforming the dual-track equity
system. As for year 2004, all M&A events occurred during a downward
market.
In the next section, we will use the factors of ownership structures (as in
table 7.5 and table 7.6) and aggregate market performance (as in table 7.7,
for 2005) to divide our sample and examine whether the returns of M&A
events may depend on these factors.
7.3 Stock Market Valuation of M&A Events
We divide the event period (t0, t2) into the preannouncement subperiod
(t0, t1 – 1), and postannouncement subperiod (t1, t2), with t1 as the date of
announcement (see ﬁgure 7.3).
In order to use the event-study method, we need to estimate the expected
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Table 7.6 Types of controlling shareholders in 2004
State holding  Privately owned  Foreign-owned 
Type company enterprise company Others Total
Shanghai 278 91 3 25 397
Shenzhen 148 51 0 15 214
Total 426 142 3 40 611
Fig. 7.1 Shanghai Composite Index, 2000–2007returns from holding the stocks of M&A companies if the M&A event did
not occur, which are then used as the benchmark for computing the ab-
normal returns. The period (t0, t1 – 1) before announcing the M&A at t  
t1 is used as the basis to estimate the daily expected returns in the CAPM
framework:
(1) Rit    i    iRmt   εit for t   t0 to t   t1   1, i   1, . . . , N,
where Rmt is the returns on market index in period t. We deﬁne rit   (Pit –
Pit–1)/Pit–1and adopt the continuously compounded rate of return Rit ln(1
  rit) and Rmt   ln(1   rmt). Then daily abnormal returns (AR) before and
after the announcement, that is, t   t0 to t   t1 – 1 and t   t1 to t   t2, can
be computed as:
(2) ARit   Rit   E(Rit),
with
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Fig. 7.2 Shenzhen Component Index, 2000–2007
Table 7.7 Merger activities in upward and downward markets in 2005
Period of downward index  Period of upward index  Total
(2005.1.1–2005.6.3) (2005.6.6–2005.12.31) Total
Shanghai 178 290 468
Shenzhen 122 162 284
Total 300 452 752(3) E(Rit)    i    iRmt, for t   t0 to t   t2.
Then we can aggregate across securities to obtain average abnormal returns
(AAR). The associated average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) is:









In our study, the preannouncement period (–50, –1) corresponds to (t0,
t1 – 1), and the postannouncement period (0,39) corresponds to (t1, t2) in
the preceding formulation.
We ﬁrst analyze the data for 2004 and ﬁnd that the AAR and CAR of 
all merger activities (611 events, see table 7.8) were signiﬁcantly negative
(table 7.9).
It is quite surprising to ﬁnd that the AAR and CAR of M&A events were
signiﬁcantly negative in 2004. We next analyze the CAR of all merger ac-
tivities in 2005 (752 events, see table 7.10). In contrast, we discover that
AAR and CAR were signiﬁcantly positive (table 7.11).
In order to better understand how average abnormal returns (AAR) and
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) evolved over time, we also plot them
for 2004 and 2005 separately (ﬁgure 7.4 and ﬁgure 7.5). This constitutes a
very interesting phenomenon for China’s M&A activities: either small pos-
itive returns or signiﬁcantly negative returns, as in 2005 and 2004. It is quite
diﬀerent from the experiences of other countries (see Bruner 2002; Bris and
Cabolis 2003; Agrawal, Jaﬀe, and Mandelker 1992; Datta, Pinches, and
Narayanan 1992; Dodd and Ruback 1977; Gillan, Kensinger, and Martin
2000; Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter 1988; Leeth and Borg 2000; Mulherin
and Boone 2000; Schwert 1996).
In addition, we ﬁnd that transaction volume of the stocks involved in
M&A jumped at the date of announcement (t   0) and stayed quite stable
on other days in 2005, and the situation was also similar in 2004 (ﬁgure
7.6). One may conclude that the stock market more or less treated the an-
nouncement of M&A events as a piece of new information in this period.
In order to understand why the CAR is negative in 2004, we separate all
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Fig. 7.3 Time line of the eventindustries. However, we discover that the major source of the negative re-
turns might be due to the ownership structure. Those events with state
holding companies as the ﬁnal shareholder (called the ﬁrst kind) had a
large negative CAR (ﬁgure 7.7), while those privately owned enterprises as
the ﬁnal shareholder (called the second kind) demonstrated a signiﬁcantly
positive CAR (ﬁgure 7.8). Because the weight of the ﬁrst kind (426 out of
611 events) is larger than the second kind (142 out of 611 events), we have
a combined impact of negative returns for 2004. This may lead us to con-
sider the M&A events initiated by state holding companies as not so fo-
cused on enhancing the value of the ﬁrm, while those done by privately
owned enterprises might be more motivated by eﬃciency concerns. It may
be due to the fact that the government may want to achieve a diﬀerent ob-
jective.
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Table 7.8 Descriptive statistics of all merger activities in 2004
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation
AAR –0.0020412 0.0018957 –0.0002216 0.0009668
CAR –0.0199465 0.0011907 –0.0066257 0.0058423
Table 7.9 Signiﬁcance test of all merger activities in 2004 (test value   0)
95% conﬁdence interval 
of the diﬀerence
t Signiﬁcance (2-tailed) Mean diﬀerence Lower Upper
AAR –2.1747762 0.032299 –0.0002216 –0.0004241 –1.914E-05
CAR –10.75884 8.799E-18 –0.0066257 –0.0078493 –0.005402
Table 7.10 Descriptive statistics of all merger activities in 2005
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation
AAR –0.002816 0.0055395 0.0001699 0.0011215
CAR –0.007585 0.0189335 0.0057595 0.0078968
Table 7.11 Signiﬁcance test of all merger activities in 2005 (test value   0)
95% conﬁdence interval 
of the diﬀerence
t Signiﬁcance (2-tailed) Mean diﬀerence Lower Upper
AAR 1.429 0.157 0.0001699 –6.64E-05 0.0004061
CAR 6.881 0 0.0057595 0.0040961 0.007423In 2005, we also examine whether ownership structures had inﬂuence on
the value created through M&A. We ﬁnd that M&A activities with the
state as the controlling party (CAR at t 40 is 1.83 percent) and those with
the private enterprises as the controlling party (CAR at t   40 is 1.11 per-
cent) all produced positive returns (ﬁgure 7.9 and ﬁgure 7.10). This may
demonstrate that the state holding companies paid more attention to value
creation in their M&A activities and that the ownership structure was not
such a signiﬁcant factor in inﬂuencing the values of M&A events in 2005.
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Fig. 7.4 CAR of all merger activities (average CAR   –0.662%) in 2004
Fig. 7.5 CAR of all merger activities (average CAR   0.575%) in 2005Fig. 7.6 Transaction volume, 2005
Fig. 7.7 State holding companies as the controlling party, 2004
Fig. 7.8 Privately owned enterprises as the controlling party, 2004In order to understand better how the stock market evaluates merger ac-
tivities when they produce positive returns, we separate the sample into ac-
quiring ﬁrms and target ﬁrms in 2005. The average CARs of both types are
less than 1 percent (table 7.12 and table 7.13).
In contrast to the ﬁndings with U.S. data, with the sample of China’s
2005 M&A events, the bidders in China obtained a signiﬁcantly positive
but small return (CAR at t   40 is 1.68 percent). Also in contrast to the
U.S. market, the target ﬁrms’ returns (CAR at t   40 is 2.03 percent) were
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Fig. 7.10 Privately owned enterprise as the controlling party (average CAR  
0.504%), 2005
Fig. 7.9 State holding company as the controlling party (average CAR  
0.625%), 2005also much smaller than their counterparts in the United States, where the
target ﬁrms can earn up to 20 to 30 percent (ﬁgure 7.11 and ﬁgure 7.12).
The other possible deciding factor for the diﬀerent M&A performances
in 2004 and 2005 may be the aggregate market performance. While the
market in 2004 had a downward trend over the whole period, the market in
2005 witnessed both a depressed market (before June 3) and an upbeat
market. As a possible channel to discern the diﬀerent M&A performances
between 2004 and 2005, we separate our 2005 sample into a period with
downward index and another with upward index (ﬁgure 7.13 and ﬁgure
7.14). We ﬁnd that merger activities increase a company’s value both in a
depressed market (CAR at t   40 is 3.19 percent) and in an upbeat market
(CAR at t   40 is 0.78 percent). Because we use the CAPM as the bench-
mark to compute excess returns, this demonstrates that after correcting
market conditions, M&A events had positive returns in both depressed
and upbeat markets in 2005. It is diﬀerent from the performance of 2004,
when M&A activities produced negative returns in a depressed market.
Because the period with upward trend coincided with the early phase of
reforming the dual-track equity system, our results (from ﬁgure 7.13 and
ﬁgure 7.14) may demonstrate that the reform itself did not have a direct im-
pact on M&A performance. However, the reform might have indirect and
lasting inﬂuences on the improvement of eﬃciency in China’s stock market.
Besides using the event period (–49,40), we also tried diﬀerent windows
such as (–24,20) and (–12,10). We also tried to set the preannouncement
period to (t0, t1 – 5), allowing the possibility of leak of information before
announcement. However, the results are quite similar, and we omit them in
this version of the paper.
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Table 7.12 CAR of acquiring ﬁrms, 2005 (test value   0)
95% conﬁdence interval 
of the diﬀerence
t df Signiﬁcance (2-tailed) Mean diﬀerence Lower Upper
AAR 0.958 88 0.341 0.0001666 –0.000179 0.0005124
CAR 8.948 88 0 0.0064602 0.0050255 0.0078949
Table 7.13 CAR of target ﬁrms, 2005
95% conﬁdence interval 
of the diﬀerence
t df Signiﬁcance (2-tailed) Mean diﬀerence Lower Upper
AAR 1.185 88 0.239 0.000227 –0.000154 0.0006076
CAR 4.946 88 0 0.0051033 0.0030527 0.0071539We can conclude this section by noting that the event-study method pro-
duces some rather interesting results for the valuation of merger activities in
China. We found that the M&A activities produced negative returns in
2004, but positive, although small, returns in 2005. Although China’s stock
market may not have reached the level of eﬃciency in advanced economies,
our preliminary investigation demonstrates that its eﬃciency has been im-
proved from 2004 to 2005. This chapter also shows that stock market valu-
ation of all merger activities in China is mildly positive in 2005, which may
also help to enhance the allocative role of China’s stock market in the future.
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Fig. 7.11 CAR of acquiring ﬁrms (average CAR   0.641%), 2005
Fig. 7.12 CAR of target ﬁrms (average CAR   0.508%), 20057.4 Accounting Indicators Before and After Mergers
In this section, we study the ﬁnancial conditions of merging ﬁrms. Be-
cause the returns on M&A events in 2004 are negative, we only concentrate
on verifying whether ﬁnancial conditions also improve for the M&A events
with positive returns in 2005. We collect accounting information from 2002
to 2006 for the 587 ﬁrms involved in the M&A activities in 2005. First, we
obtain EPS, earning before interest and taxes (EBIT) per share, and cash
ﬂow per share of all ﬁrms we studied in the last section. From table 7.14and
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Fig. 7.13 Period of downward index (average CAR   0.963%), 2005
Fig. 7.14 Period of upward index (average CAR   0.312%), 2005ﬁgure 7.15, we can see clearly that all three indicators decline in 2005, the
year of the merger, and improve in 2006, the year after the merger. The
growth rates of the last two years are –27 percent and 55 percent for EPS,
–8 percent and 23 percent for EBIT per share, and –138 percent and 270
percent for cash ﬂow per share. These three indicators demonstrate a con-
sistent pattern before, during, and after the merger.
Next, we study the earning ability of these ﬁrms, which forms the basis
of a ﬁrm’s strong ﬁnancial condition. From table 7.15 and ﬁgure 7.16, we
can ﬁnd that EBIT increases over the whole period but ROE and ROA
both decrease in 2005 and then improve in 2006. The growth rates for the
last two years are –71 percent and 273 percent for ROE and –14 percent
and 25 percent for ROA. In contrast to the ﬁndings in the U.S. market, our
results show a clear pattern for the 587 ﬁrms combined together.
The ability to service debt is another way to measure the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
conditions. We ﬁrst study the current ratio, which is current asset (cash,
cash equivalent, accounts receivable, and inventory) divided by current li-
ability (short-term loans and accounts payable). Because inventory is not
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Table 7.14 Earnings per share (EPS), EBIT, cash ﬂow per share, 2002–2006
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EPS 0.161864 0.13994 0.13541 0.09876 0.153206
EBIT per share 0.291789 0.284257 0.291105 0.267955 0.329258
Cash ﬂow per share 0.073534 0.043986 0.040717 –0.01556 0.027136
Fig. 7.15 Accounting information (per share) for all merging ﬁrmseasy to convert into cash, the quick ratio, which does not include inventory
in the numerator, is also computed for our data set. These two ratios mea-
sure the ﬁrm’s ability to repay short-term debt.
The normal range of the current ratio is within 0.5 to 2.0. For our 587
ﬁrms, their average is within the safe range, but it clearly declines over time.
The quick ratio should have its ideal range around 1. We can see that the
average of quick ratio fell below 1 after the merger in 2005. Both ratios of
these merging ﬁrms clearly become worse after 2005. So the short-term
ability of these merging ﬁrms to repay debt has declined after the merger
(see table 7.16).
We use the liability to equity ratio and the equity multiplier to represent
the long-term ability to repay debt. As the liability to equity ratio increases,
the ability to repay debt has declined, as shown in ﬁgure 7.17, before and
after the merger. In the mean time, as the equity multiplier, which is deﬁned
to be the ratio of asset to equity, rises in the ﬁrm’s reliance on debt has also
increased (ﬁgure 7.18).
Before closing this section, we present the cash ﬂows of these ﬁrms over
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Table 7.15 Earning ability, 2002–2006
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EBIT (billion RMB) 0.214956 0.253167 0.331346 0.368624 0.447996
Return of equity 4.769542 4.070747 3.650489 1.049658 3.917524
Return of assets 4.943371 4.563602 4.337534 3.726122 4.671156
Fig. 7.16 Earning ability of all merging ﬁrms, 2002–2006Table 7.16 Ability to repay debt, 2002–2006
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Liability to equity ratio 44.8117 47.34732 50.01123 52.28126 52.64088
Current ratio 1.632192 1.525752 1.427801 1.333356 1.32292
Quick ratio 1.240658 1.123622 1.021103 0.933706 0.889238
Equity multiplier 2.0863 2.151938 2.229744 2.466456 2.89927
Fig. 7.17 Liability equity ratios
Fig. 7.18 Ability to repay debtthe four-year horizon. Both operating cash ﬂows (OCF), which is EBIT
plus depreciation minus taxes, and free cash ﬂows (FCF), which is OCF
minus any expenditures necessary to maintain the ﬁrm’s operating assets,
measure the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability before or after deducting investment ex-
penditures. From table 7.17 and ﬁgure 7.19, we can see that the proﬁtabil-
ity of the merging ﬁrms has improved after the merger in 2005.
By using the accounting method in this section, we can conclude that the
ﬁnancial conditions of the M&A ﬁrms showed a certain degree of decline
in the ﬁrst year of the M&A event, but improve in the next year. However,
the short-term and long-term ability to repay debt declined without a clear
sign of improvement after the merger.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we examine 1,363 M&A events involving 1,086 compa-
nies traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2004 to
2005. Our event-study analysis indicates that within the event period (–50
days, 40 days), M&A activities produced negative returns in 2004, but pos-
itive, although small, returns in 2005. For the 2004 data with negative re-
turns in aggregate, we discover that M&A activities controlled by state hold-
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Table 7.17 Cash ﬂows, 2002–2006 (100 million RMB)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Operating cash ﬂow 3.244178 3.807216 4.599242 5.102536 5.91053
Free cash ﬂow of ﬁrm 0.373923 0.417455 –0.25308 0.549061 0.815731
Fig. 7.19 Cash ﬂows, 2002–2006ing companies were responsible for producing those negative returns, while
the M&A events initiated by privately owned enterprises had positive re-
turns. For the 2005 data with positive returns in aggregate, both types of
M&A activities produced positive but small returns.
We also separate the 2005 data into acquiring and target ﬁrms and dis-
cover that the acquiring ﬁrms and target ﬁrms received, respectively, 1.68
percent and 2.03 percent in China, while the target ﬁrms often received
over 20 percent of returns in the U.S. market. In addition, we found that the
M&A companies’ industries and the market’s aggregate performance did
not have signiﬁcant impacts on the returns of M&A events.
Our results may demonstrate that China’s stock market might not have
reached the level of eﬃciency of the more-advanced economies, but its eﬃ-
ciency in assessing the value of M&A activities might have been improved
from 2004 to 2005. The stock market valuation of M&A events became
mildly positive in 2005, which may help to enhance the allocative role of
China’s stock market in the future.
Analyzing accounting indicators within a longer observation period
(four years), we also discover that the ﬁnancial conditions of companies in-
volved in M&A in 2005 showed a certain degree of decline in the ﬁrst year
of the M&A event, but an obvious improvement in the following year.
However, the short-term and long-term ability to repay debt declined
without a clear sign of improvement after the merger.
This chapter serves as a pioneering study for China’s M&A activities.
There are many interesting phenomena discovered in this preliminary
study. However, precise measurements and more studies with control
groups to disaggregate the total eﬀects should be included in the future
work. As China’s stock market grows rapidly with fundamental institu-
tional changes, more in-depth studies will help us to understand how this
major market functions in transition.
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Comment Kaoru Hosono
Using merger and acquisition (M&A) events involving listed companies in
China during the 2004 to 2005 period, the author found the following facts:
1. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the M&A ﬁrms was sig-
niﬁcantly negative in 2004, while it was signiﬁcantly positive in 2005.
2. In 2004, M&A activities initiated by state-owned companies had neg-
ative returns, while those done by privately owned companies had positive
returns. In 2005, both types of companies had positive returns from
M&As.
3. In 2005, the CARs of acquiring and target ﬁrms were both signiﬁ-
cantly positive, though small.
4. For the companies involved in 2005 M&A events, return on assets
(ROA) and other ﬁnancial conditions showed a decline in the year of
M&A, but recovered in the following year. On the other hand, leverage in-
creased after M&A.
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